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Abstract
This paper argues that we should assign certainty a central place in epistemology.
While epistemic certainty played an important role in the history of epistemology, re-
cent epistemology has tended to dismiss certainty as an unattainable ideal, focusing its
attention on knowledge instead. I argue that this is a mistake. Attending to certainty
attributions in the wild suggests that much of our everyday knowledge qualifies, in
appropriate contexts, as certain. After developing a semantics for certainty ascriptions,
I put certainty to explanatory work. Specifically, I argue that by taking certainty as our
central epistemic notion, we can shed light on a variety of important topics, including
evidence and evidential probability, epistemic modals, and the normative constraints
on credence and assertion.
1 Introduction
For much of its history, epistemology focused on certainty. Philosophers such as Aquinas,
Scotus, and Descartes all conceived of certainty—or scientia—as the epistemic ideal. More-
over, there was broad agreement on what this involved. In order for a belief to qualify as
certain, it needed to be immune to both doubt and rational revision. For these philoso-
phers, a central task of epistemology was to determine which of our beliefs could attain
this exalted status.1
But these days, epistemologists have little time for certainty. Knowledge has stolen the
spotlight.
To hear most epistemologists tell it, this shift from certainty to knowledge is an im-
provement. In our Cartesian youth we thought that certainty was attainable, but time has
taught us better. After all, the reasoning goes, precious few of our beliefs are so secure that
they cannot be doubted or rationally revised. Perhaps some logical truths and the cogito
meet this high bar; perhaps not even these.2 Knowledge, by contrast, is more abundant.
Consequently, it’s a better candidate to serve as the foundation for a useful epistemology.
This paper questions received wisdom on this front; I argue that certainty should
occupy a central place in epistemology. In doing so, I do not advocate a return to some
1Aquinas 1970; Scotus 1987; Descartes 1983, AT X: 362. See Pasnau 2014, 2017 for discussion of the
connection between scientia and certainty in the medieval and early modern tradition.
2For prominent 20th century endorsements of the view that certainty is seldom, if ever, attained, see a.o.
Russell 1912; Dewey 1929, C.I. Lewis 1929; Ayer 1936; Reichenbach 1963; Unger 1971, 1975.
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sort of Cartesian naivete´. Contemporary epistemologists are right that very few beliefs
are in principle immune to doubt or rational revision. However, I’ll argue that the right
response to this insight is not to reject certainty, but rather to reject the ultra-demanding
conception of certainty that is so often assumed.
The first half of this paper develops a more plausible account of certainty (§§2-3). At-
tending to our everyday certainty attributions suggests that many humdrum facts can
qualify as certain. A natural way of accommodating this is to opt for a contextualist treat-
ment of certainty ascriptions. In some contexts, certainty is extremely difficult to attain;
in others, the bar is lower. At the same time, I argue that we should resist assimilating
certainty to knowledge. While certainty is often attainable, it is still a more demanding
state than knowledge.
Equipped with a new account of certainty, the second half of the paper (§§4-5) puts
this notion to explanatory work. Suppose we were to take certainty as our central no-
tion and try to understand other epistemic phenomena in terms of it. How far could we
get? Surprisingly far, it turns out. I’ll argue that we can use certainty to illuminate evi-
dence, evidential probability, and epistemic modals, as well as the normative constraints
on credence and assertion. Moreover, the explanations that emerge have important advan-
tages over more familiar ‘Knowledge First’ treatments of these topics.3 The upshot: many
of the epistemological jobs traditionally assigned to knowledge are better performed by
certainty.
2 Towards an account of certainty
While the analysis of knowledge has spawned a massive literature, the analysis of certainty
has received comparatively little contemporary attention. This section tries to remedy this
state of neglect. I propose an account of certainty that has two main virtues: it makes sense
of the semantic properties of everyday certainty-talk, and it sheds light on the connections
between certainty, knowledge, and belief. Once our account is in place, we will be in a
better position to evaluate the charge that certainty is an unattainable ideal—a topic that I
take up in §3.
2.1 Psychological vs. epistemic certainty
It’s common to distinguish between psychological and epistemic certainty.4 Psychological
certainty is a matter of strength of conviction. A belief can be psychologically certain even
if it is held for no good reason. By contrast, if a belief is epistemically certain, the believer
must stand in a strong epistemic relation to its content.
While certain and its cognates are ambiguous between these two senses, some construc-
tions favor one reading over the other (Moore 1959; Stanley 2008; DeRose 2009). Claiming
that a person is certain of something usually conveys psychological certainty:
3The locus classicus of ‘Knowledge First’ epistemology is Williamson 2000. For important elaborations of the
Knowledge First approach, see a.o. Hawthorne 2004; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008; Sutton 2007; Weatherson
2012; Littlejohn forthcoming.
4See e.g. Moore 1959; Klein 1981; Stanley 2008; DeRose 2009; Reed 2011.
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(1) I’m certain/sure that the butler did it.
(1) can be true even if the speaker irrationally believes the butler did it.
Claiming that a proposition is certain usually conveys epistemic certainty:
(2) It’s certain that the butler did it.
(2) seems to entail that the speaker stands in a strong epistemic position with regards to
the proposition that the butler did it.
What is the relation between these two species of certainty? A natural thought is that
the link is normative: p is epistemically certain for A iff A ought to be psychologically
certain that p. This explains the oddity of conjunctions of the form:
(3) ?
{
It’s certain
I’m certain
}
that the butler did it, but
{
I’m not certain
it’s not certain
}
he did it.
According to this proposal, (3) is infelicitous because anyone who uttered it would be
committed to violating a basic rational requirement.
2.2 Certainty vs. knowledge
Can more be said about either form of certainty? For many—particularly those sympa-
thetic to the Knowledge First program—it will be tempting to understand certainty in
terms of knowledge. Psychological certainty, some may suggest, is the level of confidence
required for knowledge. Epistemic certainty is the epistemic position required for knowl-
edge: it is being in a position to know.5
However, I think there is reason to doubt that knowledge requires either species of
certainty. First, knows for certain is not redundant. To see this, imagine that it’s the first day
of Epistemology 101, and you’re trying to get your students to feel the pull of Descartes’
project. Most likely, you’d ask (4a) rather than (4b):
(4) a. What can we know for certain/with certainty?
b. What can we know?6
More generally, if I say that someone knows something with certainty, I am making a
stronger claim than if I merely say that they know it.
The difference between knows and knows for certain is not a quirk of English. A wide
variety of languages carve out the same distinction. Here are some examples from Italian,
Romanian, Bahasa Indonesian, Malayalam, Korean, and Japanese, respectively:
5The idea that knowledge entails either psychological or epistemic certainty (or both) can be found in Ayer
1956; Moore 1959; Unger 1975, among others.
6Arguably, asking (4a) rather than (4b) fits better with Descartes’ own views on knowledge. While
Descartes is widely interpreted as holding that knowledge requires certainty, Descartes’ discussion of the
atheist mathematician in the Second Replies casts doubt on this interpretation. In his discussion, Descartes
draws a distinction between cognitio and scientia: the atheist’s belief that a triangle’s three angles are equal to
two right angles amounts to cognitio, but not scientia (AT VII 141). On a natural reading, cognitio still amounts
to a species of knowledge, it is simply a lower grade than scientia. For further discussion, see Sosa 1997;
Wykstra 2008; Pasnau 2014.
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(5) So
I know
per
for
certo
sure
che
that
Ronaldo
Ronaldo
non
not
giochera’
will play
la
the
prossima
next
partita
game
‘I know for sure that Ronaldo will not play the next game’
(6) Bine,
OK,
dar
but
stii
know
tu
you
sigur
sure
ca
that
vine
she’s coming
maine?
tomorrow?
‘OK, but do you know for sure she’s coming tomorrow?’
(7) Tetapi
But
anda
you
tidak
do not
tahu
know
dengan
with
pasti.
certainty.
‘But you do not know for certain.’
(8) enik:j@
to.me
at”@
that
orap:a:jiú:e
solidly
arija:m.
know.
‘I know that for sure’
(9) na.nun
I
pi-ga
rain
o.go-it’a-nun.kos-ul
falling
hwakSR-i
certain
an-da.
know.
‘I know for certain that it’s raining’
(10) [doko-ni
where
iru-noka],
be
[dou
how
shi-teiru-noka]-o
do
kakujitsu-ni
certain
shiru-tame-no
know-for
houhou.
method.
‘methods for knowing with certainty where [they] are and how [they] are doing’7
In each of these languages, the counterpart of knows for certain picks out a stronger state
than the counterpart of knows.8
Could we explain the difference in strength between knows and knows for certain on
pragmatic grounds? Perhaps, some may suggest, both knows and certain are context-
sensitive expressions governed by the same standards. And so in any context in which
A knows p is true, the corresponding psychological and epistemic certainty ascriptions are
also true. However, perhaps yoking knows and certain together in the complex phrase
knows for certain drives up the standards for both knowledge and certainty.
In order for this pragmatic explanation to be plausible, it would need to follow from
a more general principle governing the interpretation of context-sensitive expressions.
According to this more general principle, whenever two context-sensitive expressions are
governed by the same standards, combining them in a complex phrase drives up the
standards associated with each. But if we consider other context-sensitive expressions
we find that things don’t work this way. For example, likely and probable are presumably
governed by the same standards. But claiming that an event is likely and probable smacks
of redundancy; it’s not naturally interpreted as saying that the event is extremely likely.9
7Example taken from a blog post on how to get in touch with friends and family after a natural disaster:
http://shinsairegain.jp/2016/03/20/communicationline/
8For these examples, and discussion of their interpretation, I am grateful to Carlotta Pavese, Mona Simion,
Qu Hsueh, Savithry Namboodiripad, Jiseung Kim, Andrew Moon, and Mitcho Erlewine.
9As a referee points out, there may be some cases where combining two synonyms in a complex expression
serves to drive up the standards—perhaps full and complete answer works this way. However, such examples
tend to be fairly isolated; they also tend to have a conventional flavor. By contrast, knows for certain crops
up in a wide variety of languages hailing from different language families, suggesting that it is not similarly
conventional.
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A further difficulty for a pragmatic explanation of the non-redundancy of knows for
certain—and a further reason to doubt the knowledge-certainty entailment—comes from
cases where it’s natural to ascribe knowledge while denying certainty. Consider the un-
confident examinee (Radford 1966). Throughout his oral history exam, his answers are
fumbling and hesitant, yet invariably correct. The exam concluded, it would be natural
for his surprised examiner to remark, ‘Turns out he knew the answers all along’. Yet it
would also be natural to deny that he was certain of the answers (Armstrong 1969; Stanley
2008; McGlynn 2014).
Ascriptions of knowledge without certainty are not confined to the pages of philo-
sophical journals. Some examples ‘from the wild’:
(11) [W]e know without certainty, but with a high degree of probability, that returns
over the next 10 years or so will be very poor.10
(12) When [a false ID] is handed to a cop, he knows with near certainty the guy before
him is not the guy identified on the flimsy piece of paper.11
(13) We now know with near-certainty that Russia did this with the goal of electing
Trump.12
(11) explicitly ascribes knowledge without certainty. (12)-(13) ascribe knowledge that is
nearly certain, implying that it is not actually certain.13
At this point, some may concede that knowledge does not require psychological cer-
tainty, while still maintaining that it requires epistemic certainty. However, this position
stands in tension with the normative connection between psychological and epistemic cer-
tainty. As we’ve seen, it’s natural to hold that one should be psychologically certain of p
iff p is epistemically certain. If knowledge entails epistemic certainty, then anyone who
knows p is rationally required to be psychologically certain that p. But this seems wrong.
10http://www.smithers.co.uk/news_article.php?id=16&o=50.
11Geeting 2005: 96
12http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/12/trump-mcconnell-putin-and-the-triumph-of-
the-will-to-power.html
13A referee raises the possibility that these expressions of uncertainty modify the content of the knowledge
rather than the manner of knowing. For example, perhaps (11) and (12) should be paraphrased as:
(i) We know that it’s not certain, but highly probable, that returns. . .
(ii) When [a false ID] is handed to a cop, he knows that it’s nearly certain the guy before him is not. . .
However, compositional considerations count against this ‘content-modifying’ interpretation. The most
straightforward compositional semantics for the prepositional phrases without certainty and with near certainty
treats them as restrictive modifiers. In (11)-(13), these modifiers combine with the verb knows, suggesting
that they characterize the manner of knowing. One advantage of this interpretation is that it allows us
to analyze (11)-(13) in the same way we would analyze structurally similar sentences where the content-
modifying interpretation gives the wrong results, e.g.:
(iii) The detective stated without hesitation that the butler did it.
Here, the prepositional phrase without hesitation does not modify the content of the detective’s statement.
(The detective is not claiming that without hesitation the butler did it.) Rather, it characterizes the manner in
which the detective made the statement.
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Consider again the unconfident examinee. While the examinee’s memory is highly reli-
able, it could be rational for him to harbor doubts about its reliability. As a result, it could
be rational for him to be less than certain that, say, Elizabeth I died in 1603.
While this is hardly the last word on the matter, I think these considerations give
reason to doubt that knowledge entails either psychological or epistemic certainty.14 On
the picture that emerges, psychological certainty involves a particularly high degree of
confidence—higher than that required for knowledge. And in order for such a high degree
of confidence to be warranted, one must be in a particularly strong epistemic position—
stronger than that usually required for knowledge.
How should we understand these differences in strength of epistemic position? Ac-
cording to a common view, knowledge involves eliminating possibilities of error: to know
p is to be in a state that rules out possibilities in which p is false. However, it need not
rule out all possibilities of error, only those that are sufficiently plausible, or sufficiently
nearby. Perhaps epistemic certainty likewise eliminates possibilities of error, just a wider
range thereof.
To illustrate, take one of our ascriptions of knowledge without certainty, (12) (When
[a false ID] is handed to a cop, he knows with near certainty the guy before him is not the guy
identified on the flimsy piece of paper). Here the speaker is claiming that when a cop receives
a false ID, the cop’s epistemic state eliminates all plausible scenarios in which the person
in front of him is the person whose name is on the ID. But his epistemic state leaves
open various far-fetched possibilities in which this isn’t the case—for example, scenarios
in which someone created a fake ID for themselves in order to sow confusion.
2.3 Certain as a quantifier over worlds
One way to develop this proposal with greater precision draws on the resources of epis-
temic and doxastic logic. The standard approach to epistemic and doxastic logic, due to
Hintikka (1962), treats knows and believes as modal operators. For someone to know p is for
p to hold in all worlds consistent with what they know—call these the ‘K-alternatives’. For
someone to believe p is for p to hold in all worlds consistent with what they believe—call
these the ‘B-alternatives’. Here the ‘worlds’ in question are not assumed to be metaphys-
ically possible; instead, they can be viewed as maximally complete states of information.
One attractive feature of this framework is that it allows us to model properties of
knowledge and belief in terms of constraints on the underlying accessibility relations. For
example, to capture the factivity of knowledge, it’s standard to take the K-alternatives
at w to include w. To capture the idea that knowledge asymmetrically entails belief, it’s
standard to take the K-alternatives at w to include the B-alternatives, but not vice versa.
This framework extends naturally to certainty. We can propose that for p to be epis-
temically certain is for p to hold in all the ‘E -alternatives’—that is, all the worlds consistent
with what is epistemically certain. To capture the idea that epistemic certainty requires a
14A residual worry: if knowledge doesn’t require certainty, why does it sound odd to claim, I don’t know for
certain p, but I do know p? I’ll defer this issue to §5, where I’ll argue that a natural explanation is pragmatic.
Epistemic certainty is the norm of assertion; since knowledge is factive, no one could make such a claim while
abiding by the norm of assertion.
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stronger epistemic position than knowledge, we require that the K-alternatives are always
a subset of the E -alternatives, but not vice versa. (See Fig. 1.)
E -alternatives at w
K-alternatives at w
Key
w
Figure 1: Knowledge & Epistemic Certainty
Formulated thus, the account is non-reductive: it does not try to explain epistemic
certainy in more basic terms. It could, however, be supplemented with a reductive account
of the E -alternatives. For example, internalists could take the E -alternatives to be the
worlds consistent with the agent’s phenomenal states. Reliabilists could take them to be
the worlds consistent with whichever of the agent’s beliefs are produced by a maximally
reliable process. I suspect that the truth is more complicated than either of these simple
pictures; however, there is no need to take a stand on this matter here.
Even if we lack a reductive characterization of the E -alternatives, we could perhaps use
the E -alternatives in service of a reductive account of knowledge. For example, suppose
we help ourselves to a notion of comparative closeness between worlds. We could then
define the K-alternatives at w as the E -alternatives that are sufficiently close to w. If
closeness can be understood without recourse to knowledge, then this would amount to a
definition of knowledge in terms of closeness and epistemic certainty.15
This framework can also be used to model the relation between belief and psychologi-
cal certainty. Belief seems to be a weaker state than psychological certainty. Someone can
believe that the butler did it without being psychologically certain of the butler’s guilt,
but not vice versa. This suggests the following picture: psychological certainty is to belief as
epistemic certainty is to knowledge. Just as epistemic certainty asymmetrically entails knowl-
edge, so psychological certainty asymmetrically entails belief. To model this, we can hold
that someone is psychologically certain of p iff p holds in every world consistent with
their psychological certainties—call these the ‘P-alternatives’. To capture the asymmetric
entailment between psychological certainty and belief, we require that the P-alternatives
are always a superset of the B-alternatives.
A quantifier-over-worlds model of certainty yields a number of further predictions, two
of which are worth mentioning. First, since the E -alternatives include the K-alternatives,
which include the actual world, our model predicts that epistemic certainty entails truth.
This seems plausible. Suppose the detective has good but not conclusive evidence that the
15Another option in the ballpark would be to help ourselves to a notion of comparative normality across
worlds. We could then define the K-alternatives at w as the E -alternatives that are at least as normal as w
(cf. Goodman and Salow 2018; Beddor and Pavese 2018). This would amount to a definition of knowledge in
terms of normality and epistemic certainty.
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butler is guilty, and consequently exclaims (2) (It’s certain that the butler did it). Suppose
that further investigation reveals that the butler was framed. It would be natural for the
detective to retract her claim:
(14) Ok, I guess I was wrong when I said that it was certain the butler did it.
By contrast, it would be far less natural for the detective to ‘stick to her guns’ and defend
the truth of her earlier claim:
(15) ? What I said was perfectly true. After all, I didn’t say he did it. Only that it’s
certain that he did it.16
A second prediction of the quantifier-over-worlds approach is more controversial: both
epistemic and psychological certainty are closed under logical entailment. This may seem
implausible, particularly when it comes to psychological certainty. Every tautology is
trivially entailed by one’s certainties. But is everyone psychologically certain of every
tautology?
However, we should note that this is a special instance of a more general problem: the
problem of logical omniscience. Notoriously, epistemic and doxastic logics in the tradition
of Hintikka (1962) predict that every agent knows every logical truth. By now much ink
has been spilled over this problem; for our purposes, we need not take a stand on how
best to deal with it. (Perhaps quantifying over impossible worlds will help (Hintikka
1975), perhaps not.) The important point is that using this framework to model epistemic
and psychological certainty does not incur any new costs that were not already implicit in
the framework.
2.4 Certain as a gradable adjective
While an account along these lines strikes me as promising, I don’t think it can be the
complete story. As it stands, this account leaves out an important aspect of certainty: its
gradability.
Both psychological and epistemic certainty comes in degrees:
(16) It’s fairly/very/95% certain the Mets will win.
(17) Sal is fairly/very/95% certain the Mets will win.
How should we analyze these ‘graded’ uses of certain? The quantifier-over-worlds ap-
proach offers no answer. It tells us how to analyze ungraded or ‘pos form’ certainty
ascriptions such as (1) and (2), but not their graded cousins.17
If we turn to the semantics literature for guidance, we find a well-developed framework
for analyzing gradable adjectives. The core idea is that gradable adjectives are associated
with scales. In the case of tall, the scale will be degrees of height; in the case of expensive,
16Cf. von Fintel and Gillies (2010), who offer a similar argument for the conclusion that epistemic must is
factive.
17A gradable adjective occurs in the ‘pos’ (short for ‘positive’) form if it lacks overt degree morphology—
e.g., x is full (pos form) vs. x is fairly/very/95% full (graded).
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it will be units of cost. The semantic value of a gradable adjective is taken to be a function
from entities to degrees on the associated scale.
In order to apply this scalar semantics to certain, we can associate psychological uses of
certain with a psychological certainty function (PC) from propositions and agents to degrees
on a psychological certainty scale, which measures degrees of confidence. Likewise, we as-
sociate epistemic uses of certain with an epistemic certainty function (EC) from propositions
and agents to degrees on an epistemic certainty scale, which measures strength of epistemic
position. This yields a simple analysis of graded certainty ascriptions such as (16) and
(17). On this analysis, degree modifiers combine with certain in the usual ways to deliver
particular degrees on the psychological and epistemic certainty scales: fairly (psychologi-
cally) certain will deliver a fairly high degree of psychological certainty; 95% (epistemically)
certain will deliver a .95 degree of epistemic certainty, etc.
However, an important question remains. How exactly do graded certainty ascriptions
relate to their ungraded, pos form counterparts? We’d like our analysis to shed light on
this. For example, we’d like to predict that (18a) entails (18b), but not vice versa:
(18) a. Sal is certain that the Mets will win.
b. Sal is fairly certain that the Mets will win.
Happily, the standard scalar semantics also comes with a story about this. The stan-
dard strategy is to take pos form constructions to contain a null morpheme (pos) that
combines with a gradable adjective to deliver some threshold on the associated scale.
Thus the underlying form of (18a) is:
(19) Sal is pos certain that the Mets will win.
In the case of ‘relative’ gradable adjectives such as long, tall, and expensive, the threshold
will be settled by context, and is often vague. In the case of ‘maximum-standard’ gradable
adjectives (max adjectives, hereafter) such as clean, straight, and full, the threshold is always
the maximal element of the associated scale.18
The differences between relative and max adjectives show up on a range of diagnostics.
First, sentences of the form, x is α, but x could be α-er are fine when α is a relative adjective,
but anomalous when it is a max adjective:
(20) This line is long, but it could be longer.
(21) ? The line is straight, but it could be straighter.
A second diagnostic looks at interactions with degree modifiers. Max adjectives toler-
ate the modifiers almost and completely to a much greater degree than their relative brethren
(Rotstein and Winter 2004; Kennedy 2007):
(22) This line is almost straight/#long.
(23) This line is completely straight/#long.
18For discussion, see Unger 1975; Kennedy and McNally 2005; Kennedy 2007. Some authors also posit a
class of minimum-standard adjectives (bent, dirty, open) whose threshold is always the minimal element of the
associated scale. For our purposes, we can afford to ignore minimum-standard adjectives.
9
new work for certainty
As a number of authors have noted,19 certain—on both its psychological and epistemic
uses—seems to pass the tests for a max adjective with flying colors:
(24) ? It’s certain to rain, but it could be more certain.
(25) We’re almost certain to lose.
(26) I’m/it’s completely certain she’ll be there.
So if we apply the standard scalar semantics to certainty ascriptions, we get the follow-
ing picture. A pos form psychological certainty ascription, A is pos certain that p, is true
iff A has the maximal degree of psychological certainty in p. Likewise, a pos form epis-
temic certainty ascription, p is pos certain, is true iff p has the maximal degree of epistemic
certainty (for the contextually supplied agent).
A scalar semantics along these lines provides a way of relating pos form certainty
ascriptions to their graded counterparts. In doing so, it validates entailments between
the two—for example, that (18a) asymmetrically entails (18b). And while the primary
motivation for such an account is semantic, the core idea meshes well with the traditional
thought that certainty constitutes a particularly exalted ideal—that it is the highest form
of cognition.20
2.5 Integrating the two approaches
We have, then, two analyses of certainty. One uses the tools of epistemic logic, analyzing
certain as a quantifier over worlds. The other uses the tools of scalar semantics, analyzing
certain as a measure function. Both have their advantages. The quantifier-over-worlds
approach captures the connections between epistemic certainty and knowledge, and be-
tween psychological certainty and belief. The scalar semantics captures the gradability
of certainty, as well as the relations between pos form and graded certainty ascriptions.
It would be nice if we could integrate the two approaches in a way that preserves their
advantages.
Luckily we can. In developing the scalar approach, we said little about the structure
of the psychological and epistemic certainty functions. Let us now venture the following
hypothesis: both are probability functions, defined over algebras generated from the P-
alternatives and the E -alternatives, respectively. PC is a psychological probability function;
EC an epistemic probability function. Let us also assume that these probability functions
are regular, in that they only assign the maximal degree of certainty to a proposition if it
holds at every accessible world. This allows us to synthesize our two approaches: A is pos
certain that p is true iff A assigns p the maximal degree of psychological certainty, which
will in turn obtain iff p holds in all of A’s P-alternatives. Likewise, It is pos certain that p
is true iff p has the maximal degree of epistemic certainty (for some contextually supplied
19See e.g., Unger 1975; Lassiter 2010, 2011, 2017; Klecha 2012.
20For a very different scalar treatment of certainty ascriptions, see Stanley 2008: 54. On Stanley’s approach,
a pos form certainty ascription is true iff the relevant proposition’s degree of certainty exceeds some contextu-
ally determined threshold. One concern for Stanley’s approach is that it in effect amounts to analyzing certain
as a relative gradable adjective. It thus has trouble explaining why certain behaves differently from relative
gradable adjectives on the various diagnostics canvassed here.
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agent), which will obtain iff p holds in all of the agent’s E -alternatives. Lesser degrees
of certainty will correspond to lower probabilities. It’s 95% certain that the Mets will win
means that the epistemic probability that the Mets will win is .95. Sal is fairly certain that
the Mets will win means that Sal has a fairly high credence that the Mets will win.21
This integration retains the advantages of both approaches. It also yields downstream
benefits. For example, it explains why graded epistemic certainty ascriptions are not
factive, unlike their pos form counterparts: It is 99% certain that the Mets will win 6⇒ the
Mets will win. After all, no probability shy of 1 guarantees truth.22
3 Is certainty scarce?
3.1 Scarcity: for and against
Now that we have an account of certainty on the table, let us turn to the worry that led
many epistemologists to renounce the quest for certainty. The worry is that certainty is
scarce: precious little of our knowledge ever rises to the level of certainty. On the face of it,
our account seems to feed directly into this worry. After all, our account says something
is only certain (full-stop) if it has the maximal degree of certainty. But this is a high bar,
and it would seem that hardly any of our knowledge measures up. Take, for instance, my
knowledge that Marseille is in France. Does this knowledge rise to the maximal degree of
certainty, psychological or epistemic? It is natural to think the answer is ‘No’. After all,
I can imagine scenarios in which this belief is mistaken—for example, scenarios in which
I am the victim of an elaborate geographic hoax. But this seems to entail that this belief
isn’t as certain as, say, the cogito or basic logical truths.
But perhaps we shouldn’t be so quick. In ordinary contexts, I’d readily assert both:
(27) I’m certain that Marseille is in France.
(28) It’s certain that Marseille is in France.
More generally, people are fairly liberal in their certainty ascriptions: they don’t reserve
certain for a tiny sliver of their knowledge.
Thus, our everyday certainty ascriptions count against the idea that certainty is scarce.
Of course, some might simply insist that most of these ascriptions are false—a line taken
21A technical point: I require that the probability functions are regular in order to derive the quantifier-
over-worlds analysis of pos form certainty ascriptions as a special case of the scalar semantics. Some may
object that this leads to implausible consequences when the E - and P-alternatives include uncountably many
possibilities. For example, it would appear to entail that it is impossible for an infinitely fine dart to fall on a
particular point on the number line (Ha´jek 2003). The issues here are complex, and fall beyond the scope of
this paper. (See Lewis 1980; Easwaran 2014 for discussion.) However, note that it sounds quite odd to claim,
p is 100% likely, but not completely certain. This suggests that our ordinary concept of certainty—the concept
reflected in our everyday linguistic intuitions—takes the underlying probability function to be regular, even
if this requirement leads to difficulties when it comes to infinitely fine darts and the like.
22A further benefit: this integration explains why certain is gradable, whereas knows is not (or only
marginally so). The reason is that certain denotes a function from agents and propositions to degrees. By
contrast, knows does not relate agents and propositions to degrees. Instead, it is a universal quantifier over
a particular subset of contextually relevant worlds. In general, quantifiers over worlds are only marginally
gradable. (Consider the oddity of claiming, It very much must be raining, or, You somewhat ought to study.)
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by Unger (1971, 1975). But this seems like a rather desperate and undesirable maneuver.
Ceteris paribus, it would be preferable to find a way to make sentences such as (27) and
(28) come out true.
3.2 Maximality without scarcity
We can reconcile the thesis that certain is a max adjective with the truth of (27) and (28) by
relativizing gradable expressions to contextually determined standards of precision.23 To
illustrate with a different max adjective, consider again straight. In any context, something
only qualifies as straight if it has the maximal degree of straightness, as revealed by the
oddity of (21) (This line is straight, but it could be straighter). Still, it seems there is consid-
erable contextual variability in what we regard as straight. Some contexts call for strict
standards. If we are building a satellite, a microscopic dent might preclude an antenna
from qualifying as straight. Other contexts are more lax. If we are repairing my television,
I may be happy to call an antenna straight provided it is not noticeably bent.
One way to develop this thought is to allow the function denoted by a gradable adjec-
tive to vary with context. In a context with lax standards, straight denotes a coarse-grained
function—one that maps x to the maximal degree of straightness as long as x is free from
any noticeable bends. In a context with strict standards, straight denotes a fine-grained
function—one that only maps x to the maximal degree of straightness if x is free from the
tiniest dent.
This contextualist maneuver extends smoothly to certain. In a context with lax stan-
dards, certain denotes a function that maps much of an agent’s knowledge to the maximal
degree of certainty (psychological or epistemic). In stricter contexts, certain denotes a
function that allows far fewer propositions to qualify as maximally certain.24
If the psychological and epistemic certainty functions vary with context, then so too do
the sets of worlds they are defined over. How does this work? One option is to suppose
that a contextual standard of precision determines a set of relevant alternatives: a set of
possibilities that are worth taking seriously, for the purposes of the conversation. These
are the worlds that are not too distant or far-fetched, where what counts as too distant or
far-fetched is a function of context.25 We could then use the relevant alternatives to restrict
the E - and P-alternatives: the contextually restricted E -alternatives are the contextually
relevant alternatives that are consistent with what’s epistemically certain, and similarly for
the P-alternatives. The context-relative epistemic and psychological certainty functions
are probability functions defined over the contextually restricted E - and P-alternatives.
(Equivalently, a context-relative certainty function is what you get from conditionalizing
a context-independent certainty function on the proposition that none of the contextually
23Lewis (1979) sketches a response to Unger along these lines. For recent work on standards of precision,
see Sauerland and Stateva 2007; van Rooij 2011; Sassoon and Zevakhina 2012.
24One interesting consequence of this approach is that credences are themselves context-sensitive. For
independent arguments for this conclusion, see Clarke 2013. While our approaches are largely congenial,
an important difference between our views is that Clarke takes this approach to support the idea that belief
requires credence 1. One of the upshots of my paper is that what Clarke says about belief is much more
plausible as a claim about psychological certainty.
25For relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge, see Dretske 1970, Goldman 1976, and, esp., Lewis 1996.
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irrelevant alternatives obtain.)
To illustrate, take (27) and (28). In ordinary contexts, far-fetched scenarios in which
I’m the dupe of an elaborate Marseillan deception are irrelevant. In such contexts, the
proposition Marseille is in France does have the maximal degree of epistemic and psycho-
logical certainty: it obtains in all of contextually relevant worlds compatible with what
is epistemically and psychologically certain. However, when we contemplate various de-
ception scenarios, we expand the sphere of relevant alternatives.26 Relative to this new
context, Marseille is in France does not hold throughout all of the contextually restricted E -
and P-alternatives. And so it not longer qualifies as maximally certain.
By going contextualist, we block the conclusion that all of our ordinary certainty attri-
butions are false. At the same time, we preserve the advantages of the semantic framework
developed in §2. First, we still explain the data that led us to classify certain as a max adjec-
tive. After all, pos form certainty ascriptions still require the maximal degree of certainty,
it’s just that now whether something qualifies as maximally certain depends on context.
And so in any context, an utterance of e.g., (24) (It’s certain to rain, but it could be more
certain) is predicted to be infelicitous. Second, we still capture the connections between
certainty, knowledge, and belief that motivated the quantifier-over-worlds aspect of our
approach. To do so, we need only maintain that, in any context, the E -alternatives include
the K-alternatives, and the P-alternatives include the B-alternatives.27
3.3 Taking stock
I’ve argued that we should resist two impulses: the impulse to analyze certainty in terms
of knowledge, and the impulse to dismiss certainty as unattainable. According to the
treatment of certainty offered here, certainty comes in two forms: psychological and epis-
temic. The former consists in a strong conviction; the latter consists in a strong epistemic
position, not reducible to knowledge. And while certain is a max adjective, this does not
entail that certainty is scarce. In many contexts, a non-negligible subset of our everyday
knowledge qualifies as both psychologically and epistemically certain.
This contextualist conception of certainty differs in many respects from the traditional
conception of scientia championed by philosophers in the medieval and early modern tra-
dition. Still, there is an important thread of commonality. Both conceptions take certainty
to require freedom from doubt. Philosophers such as Aquinas, Scotus, and Descartes im-
posed a particularly stringent version of this requirement: they took certainty to involve
indubitability. While the contextualist does not go this far, the contextualist still maintains
that in any context where p qualifies as certain, p cannot be seriously doubted. After all,
26In doing so, we exploit some version of Lewis’ ‘Rule of Attention’ (1996: 559): attending to some possi-
bility tends to render it relevant. For discussion and refinement of this rule, see Blome-Tillman 2009.
27Of course, contextualism is controversial in its own right. One source of difficulty comes from cross-
contextual assessments: cases where a speaker makes a certainty attribution in one context, and an assessor
inhabiting a different context evaluates this claim for truth or falsity. There is at least some temptation for the
assessor to use the standards in their own context, rather than the speaker’s. This is a complex issue, and one
that I will bracket for the purposes of this paper. For those moved by this objection, one option is to move
from contextualism to relativism; we could take the relevant ‘contexts’ to be contexts of assessment rather
than contexts of utterance. For an overview and defense of relativism, see e.g., MacFarlane (2014).
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entertaining doubts about p’s truth will expand the sphere of relevant alternatives, thereby
shifting the context. Relative to this new context, p will no longer qualify as certain.28
Equipped with a contextualist treatment of certainty, we’ve paved the way for putting
certainty to work in epistemological theorizing. In what follows, I explore two specific
applications: evidential probability (§4) and epistemic modals (§5). My main contention
will be that by explaining these notions in terms of certainty, we can account for a range
of data that would otherwise be left unexplained.
4 Evidence and evidential probability
The notion of evidence plays a vital role in both traditional and formal epistemology.
But what does it take for an agent to have some proposition as part of their evidence?
Epistemologists in the Bayesian tradition typically don’t say much on this point. One
of the central contributions of Knowledge First epistemology is to try to fill this lacuna.
According to Williamson, someone possesses a proposition as evidence iff they know it:
E = K: For any agent A and time t, A’s total evidence at t = {p | A knows p at t}.29
Williamson goes on to use this proposal as the backbone of a theory of evidential proba-
bility (2000: chp.10). On the resulting theory, the evidential probability of a proposition is
its probability given what one knows.
In this section, I argue that evidence and evidential probability are intimately con-
nected with epistemic certainty. These connections are difficult to explain on a Knowledge
First account, but are readily explained by a certainty-based analysis.
4.1 Evidence
Judgments about evidence possession are closely bound up with judgments about cer-
tainty. Plausibly, if p is epistemically certain, then one’s evidence entails p. Note how odd
it would be to claim:
(29) ?? It’s certain that smoking causes cancer. But the evidence leaves open the possi-
bility that smoking doesn’t cause cancer.
By itself, this is no trouble for E = K, given the plausible assumption that epistemic
certainty entails knowledge. The trouble begins when we note that the converse seems
equally plausible: if p is entailed by the evidence, then p is epistemically certain. To
motivate this, note that the following sounds equally odd:
(30) ?? The medical evidence entails that smoking causes cancer. But it isn’t certain that
smoking causes cancer.
28Cf. Greco (2017), who makes a similar point in defending a contextualist version of foundationalism.
Greco distinguishes between a classic version of foundationalism that requires the epistemic foundations to
be indubitable and a contextualist version that only requires the foundations to be undoubted.
29See Williamson 1997, 2000: chp.9.
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Earlier we found reason to doubt that knowledge entails epistemic certainty. If it
doesn’t, then E = K has trouble accounting for these data. After all, we should expect (30)
to describe a perfectly coherent situation, one where the medical community’s knowledge
falls short of certainty.
Defenders of E = K might seek to explain the data by appealing to Williamson’s sug-
gestion that we are reluctant to let the “contextually set standards for knowledge and
certainty diverge” (2000: 204). On this view, while knowledge does not entail either epis-
temic or psychological certainty, a knowledge ascription will typically be true in a context
c only if the corresponding certainty ascriptions are also true in c.
However, the same considerations that suggest knowledge does not entail certainty
cast doubt on the idea that we’re reluctant to let the standards for knowledge and cer-
tainty diverge. As we saw in §2.2, claiming that someone knows something with certainty
is not redundant; rather, it’s naturally interpreted as claiming that they know it with a
particularly high degree of certainty. Moreover, we saw that ordinary speakers are often
happy to speak of knowledge that falls short of certainty, as revealed by (11)-(13). These
considerations suggest that the standards for certainty ascriptions are typically higher
than those for knowledge ascriptions.
From the perspective of the present essay, there is a natural remedy for this difficulty.
The remedy is to identify one’s evidence with one’s epistemic certainties rather than one’s
knowledge. Of course, if epistemic certainty ascriptions are context-sensitive, then this
leads to a contextualist account of evidence possession ascriptions:
E = C: In any context, the expression A’s evidence is co-extensive with the expression A’s
epistemic certainties.
Some might balk at the idea that evidence possession claims are context-sensitive in
this way. However, I think our ordinary patterns of evidence-talk actually fit quite nicely
with a contextualist treatment. Suppose someone asks the detective, What’s your evidence
that the butler did it? In many contexts, it would be natural to cite the fact:
(31) The cook saw the butler fleeing the scene, weapon in hand.
Suppose, however, the questioner raises the possibility that the cook’s eyesight is un-
reliable. If the detective is willing to take this possibility seriously, it would be natural
for the detective to admit that, strictly speaking, she doesn’t have (31) as a part of her
evidence. Rather, she has:
(32) The cook thought he saw the butler fleeing the scene, weapon in hand.
And we can imagine continuations of the conversation in which the detective begrudg-
ingly admits that not even (32) is part of her evidence. For example, we can imagine a
context in which she seriously entertains the possibility that the cook is lying, or in which
she starts to worry whether all her experiences are a demon-induced deception. This is
precisely the sort of contextual variability in our judgments about evidence possession
that we should expect if E = C is correct.30
30See Greco 2017 for independent considerations in favor of a contextualist account of evidence possession.
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4.2 Evidential probability
In addition to evaluating whether some hypothesis is consistent with—or entailed by—the
evidence, we can also evaluate the probability of a hypothesis given a body of evidence.
These evidential probabilities frequently have practical import. Suppose we’ve winnowed
the suspect list down to two: either the butler or the gardener did it. We don’t know for
sure which is the culprit. But it’s much more likely, given the evidence, that it was the
butler. This probabilistic difference might well make a practical difference. For example,
given our limited resources, it might be rational to focus on investigating the butler first.
Epistemologists in the Bayesian tradition have developed a rich formal apparatus for
investigating evidential probabilities. In this tradition, the evidential probability of some
proposition p is standardly defined as the probability of p given the evidence. If E =
C, then this will be the probability of p given what is certain. More precisely: for any
context c, the evidential probability of p is the probability of p conditional on whatever
propositions qualify as epistemically certain in c.
This allows us to unify evidential probabilities and degrees of certainty. Recall that
our semantics for certain appealed to an epistemic certainty function (EC), which we took
to be a probability function. Given E = C, we can now venture a further hypothesis: the
evidential probability function simply is the epistemic certainty function. Call this the
‘Certainty Account of Evidential Probability’:
Certainty Account of Evidential Probability: The evidential probability of p (relative to
a contextual standard s) is p’s degree of epistemic certainty (relative to s).
In what follows, I highlight two considerations in favor of the Certainty Account of
Evidential Probability. The first is epistemological: the Certainty Account explains the
normative connections between evidential probabilities and credences. The second is lin-
guistic: the account explains linguistic data suggesting a close connection between evi-
dential probability ascriptions and epistemic certainty ascriptions.
4.2.1 Certainty and probability: the normative link
What is point of positing evidential probabilities? What epistemological work do they
serve? At least as far back as Locke’s Essay, philosophers have been attracted to the view
that rationality requires one to proportion one’s degree of belief to the evidence. This
idea is taken for granted within much of the Bayesian tradition, where it’s frequently as-
sumed evidential probabilities constrain a rational agent’s credences. Call this the ‘Credal
Constraint’:
Credal Constraint Your credence in p should equal the probability of p given your evi-
dence.
The Credal Constraint fits very naturally with the Certainty Account of Evidential
Probability. Earlier, we suggested that there is a normative connection between psycholog-
ical and epistemic certainty. Plausibly, this normative connection also extends to degrees
of certainty. That is:
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Matching Requirement Relative to any context, your degree of psychological certainty in
p should equal the degree to which p is epistemically certain.
This requirement has considerable appeal. It seems quite odd to claim that p is n%
epistemically certain while denying that one is n% psychologically certain of p:
(33) ? It’s 99% certain the Mets will win. But I’m
{
100%
only 98%
}
certain that they’ll win.
The Matching Requirement explains this oddity. (33) is infelicitous for the same reason as
(3): no one could truly assert it while adhering to the requirements of rationality.
By contrast, the Knowledge First account of evidential probability proves harder to
integrate with the Credal Constraint. On the Knowledge First account, evidential proba-
bilities are probabilities conditional on what’s known, and so everything one knows gets
assigned probability 1. Given the Credal Constraint, it follows that one should have cre-
dence 1 in everything one knows, which is tantamount to the claim that one should be
psychologically certain of everything one knows. But we have already seen reason to reject
this claim. Recall our unconfident examinee, who knows that Queen Elizabeth I died in
1603, without being certain of it. As we saw in §2.2, it seems we can develop the case in
such a way that his lack of psychological certainty is perfectly rational.
More generally, cases of knowledge without psychological certainty are not ipso facto
cases of irrationality. This observation is difficult to reconcile with the Knowledge Ac-
count, whereas it is predicted by the Certainty Account.31
4.2.2 Certainty and probability: linguistic data
Our second argument for the Certainty Account is that it explains a range of linguistic
data. While evidential probability is something of an epistemologist’s term of art, it maps
onto an intuitive notion. This intuitive notion is reflected in our everyday use of probabil-
ity operators, e.g.:
(34) It’s likely/probable that the Mets will win.
In everyday discourse it may not always be clear what sort of probability is at issue.
However, at least some uses of (34) convey a distinctly evidential notion of probability.
Such evidential readings can be made explicit using in view of -phrases, e.g.:
(35) In view of the evidence, it’s likely/probable that the Mets will win.
These evidential probability ascriptions are closely connected to epistemic certainty
ascriptions. Both accept percentage modifiers (e.g., 99%). And when both are embedded
under the same percentage modifier, they seem to be equivalent:
31Kaplan (2003, 2009) also objects to the consequence that one should have credence 1 in everything one
knows. However, Kaplan’s objection assumes that if one has credence 1 in p, one is rationally required to
accept a bet wherein one gains a penny if p is true, and loses one’s life otherwise. This leaves open a potential
escape route, which is to simply deny this assumption (Williamson 2009). By contrast, my formulation of the
difficulty does not assume any connection between credence 1 and life-in-the-balance bets.
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(36) a. It’s 99% likely that the Mets will win.
b. It’s 99% certain that the Mets will win.
(36a) and (36b) seem interchangeable, at least when (36a) is interpreted in terms of evi-
dential probability. Indeed, it would be quite odd to affirm one while denying the other:
(37) ?? It’s 99% certain/likely the Mets will win. But it’s only 98% likely/certain that
they’ll win.
To my ears, this would only be coherent if we impose some non-evidential interpretation
on the probability operators.32
This cries out for explanation. The Certainty Account of Evidential Probability pro-
vides one. By contrast, it is far less clear how to account for this data if evidential probabil-
ities are probabilities conditional on knowledge, unless we take knowledge and epistemic
certainty to be co-extensive.
Some might worry that I’ve cherry-picked my data. According to this objection, the
equivalence between graded epistemic certainty ascriptions and graded evidential prob-
ability ascriptions only holds for percentage modifiers that denote very high degrees on
the corresponding scale. But when we look at mid-scale percentage modifiers (e.g., 60%)
the equivalence breaks down:
(38) a. It’s 60% likely the Mets will win.
b. ? It’s 60% certain the Mets will win.
In a situation where there’s a 60% chance the Mets will win, (38a) seems to be in perfectly
good order, while (38b) does not.
But I think it would be too hasty to abandon the Certainty Account of Evidential
Probability on these grounds alone. First, observe that the intuition here is not really one
of inequivalence: it’s not that there’s a situation in which (38a) is true, whereas (38b) is
false. Rather, it’s that claiming something is 60% certain sounds odd. Second, we should
be careful not to overstate its oddity. We can find naturally occurring examples of this
construction, e.g.:
(39) FSU President Bernard Sliger said it is 60 percent certain the school will join a
conference.33
What all of this suggests is that we should hold on to the idea that evidential proba-
bility ascriptions are equivalent to the corresponding epistemic certainty ascriptions. It’s
just that we prefer to avoid combining certain with mid-scale percentage modifiers. Why
is this? Here’s a natural thought. We’ve already seen that a max adjective targets the
upper end of its scale. (38) shows that our tendency to reserve certain for the upper end
of its scale persists even under degree modifiers: we are happier with 99% certain than
32Lassiter (2017: chp. 5) makes a similar observation. He gives the example of a CNN broadcast on the
2014 AirAsia crash, where multiple speakers seem to use 95% certain and 95% likely interchangeably when
discussing whether some debris was part of the airliner.
33https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1990-08-09-9002080020-story.html
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70% certain, and less happy still with 60% certain. (Though, as (39) shows, even this is
sometimes tolerated.)
By contrast, probable and likely are relative gradable adjectives. They do not target the
upper end of the probability scale, but rather some contextually determined point along
it (Yalcin 2010: 930; Lassiter 2010: 204). After all, if there’s a 70% chance that it will rain
today and an 80% chance that it will rain tomorrow, one can say:
(40) It’s likely to rain today, but it’s more likely that it will rain tomorrow.
Since likely and probable have no tendency to target the upper end of their scale, they
happily combine with mid-scale percentage modifiers, which is why (38a) is preferrable
to (38b).
Some might question this explanation on the grounds that other max adjectives happily
combine with mid-scale percentage modifiers. Take for example, full:
(41) The glass is 60% full.
But at least some speakers judge that (41) sounds fine—better, at any rate, than (38b).
However, there is an important difference between certain and full. Whereas certain
shares its scale with the relative gradable adjectives probable and likely, no relative gradable
adjective shares a scale with full. To leverage this observation into an explanation of our
data, we can appeal to a principle along the following lines:
Competition Principle (CP) A combination of an absolute adjective α with a modifier m
is dispreferred if both:
1. mα denotes a point very far from the value of pos α,
2. α has some scale-mate α′, and the point denoted by mα could be denoted by
m′α′ (where m′ is some modifier that may or may not be the same as m),
unless the combination m′α′ is itself dispreferred by CP.
This explains why 60% certain is dispreferred, whereas 60% full is not. The point
denoted by 60% certain could equally well be denoted by 60% probable, and the latter is
not dispreferred by CP (since probable is a relative gradable adjective). However, 60% full
could not equally well be denoted by a combination of a modifier with a relative gradable
adjective, so it is not dispreferred by CP.34
CP has independent explanatory appeal. First, it explains why it seems odd to describe
a glass as 1% full, or only the slightest bit full. After all, while full does not share a scale
with a relative adjective, it does share a scale with another max adjective—namely, empty,
whose maximal element is the minimal element of full. According to CP, the point denoted
by almost empty is close to the value of pos empty, and hence should be preferred.
34While to my knowledge no other researchers have advanced CP, the basic idea behind such competition-
based explanations is familiar. For example, competition explains why Some students passed implicates Not
all did (since the more informative competitor All passed should have been preferred, if it were true). For
competition-based explanations of other linguistic phenomena, see Aronoff (1976).
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Second, CP explains similar contrasts between other absolute and relative adjectives
that co-habit a scale. Consider the max adjective filthy and the relative adjective dirty.
While neither of these adjectives accepts percentage modifiers, they pattern differently
with minimizing modifiers:
(42) a. The floor is slightly/a little bit dirty.
b. ? The floor is slightly/a little bit filthy.
CP correctly predicts that combining filthy with a minimizing modifier such as slightly
or a little bit is dispreferred, since the same point could be equally well denoted by com-
bining some other modifier with its relative scalemate dirty, for example:
(43) The floor is rather/fairly/very dirty.
Summing up: epistemic uses of certain seem to be equivalent to evidential uses of prob-
able, as illustrated by (36). This provides a strong argument for the Certainty Account of
Evidential Probability. While differences in the acceptability of certain and probable under
mid-scale percentage modifiers might seem to challenge this argument, closer inspection
suggests that these differences do not reveal an inequivalence between the relevant ex-
pressions, and hence do not constitute counterexamples to the Certainty Account. Rather,
these differences are better explained by a general dispreference for combining mid-scale
percentage modifiers with a max adjective when a relative gradable adjective will serve
just as well.
5 Epistemic modals
The language of probability is part of a richer fragment of the language: modal discourse.
We not only talk about whether something is likely to be the case, we also talk about
whether something might or must be the case. If certainty is closely connected with ev-
idential probability, we should also expect certainty to be closely connected with other
modal expressions. In this section, I’ll argue that this is precisely what we find.
5.1 Two analyses of epistemic modals
The standard analysis of epistemic modals takes them to be quantifiers over the possibili-
ties compatible with some epistemic state. Possibility modals (denoted ‘♦’) such as might
and possibly are analyzed as existential quantifers. Necessity modals (denoted ‘’) such
as must, has to, and necessarily are analyzed as universal quantifiers:
Classical Analysis of Epistemic Modals:
p♦pq is true at a point of evaluation i iff p is compatible with the relevant epistemic state.
ppq is true at i iff the relevant epistemic state entails p.
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What sort of epistemic state is relevant here? The most common view is that the
relevant state is knowledge—call this the ‘Knowledge Analysis.’35 I propose instead that
the relevant state is epistemic certainty:
Certainty Analysis of Epistemic Modals:
p♦pq is true relative to a contextual standard s iff p is compatible with what’s epistemi-
cally certain (relative to s).
ppq is true relative to s iff p is entailed by what’s epistemically certain (relative to s).
In what follows, I offer novel linguistic data demonstrating a close connection between
epistemic certainty and epistemic modals. The Certainty Analysis explains these data; the
Knowledge Analysis does not.36
5.2 In favor of the Certainty Analysis
Suppose a detective asserts:
(44) The butler must/has to have done it.
We’d expect her to also be willing to assert:
(45) It’s certain that the butler did it.
Indeed, it sounds very odd to follow an assertion of (44) with a denial of (45):
(46) ?? The butler must/has to have done it. But it’s not certain that the butler did it.
We find a similarly close connection between epistemic possibility modals and cer-
tainty ascriptions. In particular, ¬♦p seems to entail that it is certain that ¬p, as suggested
by the oddity of saying:
(47) ?? There’s no possibility that the cook was involved. But it isn’t certain that the
cook wasn’t involved.
The Certainty Analysis explains these observations. According to the Certainty Anal-
ysis, (44) says that it’s epistemically certain that the butler did it. And so (46) is predicted
to be contradictory. Similarly, the first conjunct of (47) entails that it’s epistemically certain
that the cook was not involved, which contradicts the second conjunct.
35Versions of the Knowledge Analysis are defended by Hacking (1967); Kratzer (1981); DeRose (1991); Egan
et al. (2005); Egan and Weatherson (2011); Stanley (2005); Stephenson (2007); Dorr and Hawthorne (2013).
36Only a couple of authors have entertained something like the Certainty Analysis. DeRose suggests that
might is the dual of it is certain that (1998; 2009: 20). However, he seems to think certainty should be analyzed
in terms of knowledge, indicating that he doesn’t take this approach to be an alternative to the Knowledge
Analysis, which he explicitly endorses in DeRose 1991. As far as I’m aware, the only author who defends a
Certainty Analysis as an alternative to the Knowledge Analysis is Littlejohn (2011). According to Littlejohn, p
is epistemically possible for S iff ¬p is not obviously entailed by something S knows with certainty. While my
proposal differs from Littlejohn’s in points of detail, in large part this section can be seen as providing new
data in support of Littlejohn’s thesis, and embedding this thesis within a broader certainty-centric framework.
21
new work for certainty
By contrast, the Knowledge Analysis leaves these data unexplained. According to the
Knowledge Analysis, (44) says that the relevant agents’ knowledge entails the butler did it.
But if knowledge does not entail certainty, the assertability of (44) provides no guarantee
that (45) is assertable. Similarly, we’d expect (46) and (47) to be coherent: they will be true
whenever the relevant knowledge falls shy of certainty.
Could proponents of the Knowledge Analysis explain these data on pragmatic rather
than semantic grounds? One way of doing so would be to appeal to the idea that cer-
tainty is the norm of assertion. According to this explanation, while (46) and (47) could
be true, anyone who uttered them would be violating the norm of assertion. However, I
suspect this explanation would be unwelcome to most Knowledge Firsters, since it would
involve replacing a central tenet of the Knowledge First program (the knowledge norm
of assertion) with a certainty norm. While I’ll be arguing shortly that such a replace-
ment is independently motivated, it’s a concession that most Knowledge Firsters would
be reluctant to make.
Moreover, even if proponents of the Knowledge Analysis are willing to make this
concession, trouble is still in store. This is because the connection between certainty and
modals persists in embedded contexts:
(48) ?? Suppose both that there’s no possibility that the cook was involved and it’s not
certain that the cook wasn’t involved.
(49) ?? If the butler must have done it and it’s not certain whether he did it . . . 37
A merely pragmatic explanation of the infelicity of (46)-(47) does not generalize to explain
the oddity of (48)-(49). By contrast, the Certainty Analysis has no trouble here. According
to the Certainty Analysis, (48) and (49) invite the addressee to entertain an incoherent
state of affairs, thereby accounting for their infelicity.
Thus the infelicity of (46)-(49) provides compelling evidence for the Certainty Analysis.
An independent source of evidence comes from the phenomenon of modal concord. Modal
concord arises when two modals occur next to each other, but only seem to contribute the
force of a single modal (Halliday 1970; Geurts and Huitink 2006; Huitink 2012). Compare:
(50) a. You may possibly have read my little monograph on the subject.38
b. You may have read my little monograph on the subject.
The most natural reading of (50a) is a ‘concord reading’, on which it’s simply equivalent
to (50b) (or a slightly hedged version thereof). It is less natural to give (50a) a ‘cumulative’
reading, according to which it’s possible that there is a possibility that the addressee has
read the speaker’s monograph.39
37See also Beddor and Goldstein 2018 for data on the connection between epistemic modals and certainty
in belief reports.
38Geurts and Huitink (2006) take (50a) from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Hound of the Baskervilles.
39This not to deny that there’s a cumulative reading available for such constructions, or that certain contexts
might make the cumulative reading more easily accessible. There may also be dialectical variation in how
easily accessible cumulative readings are for double modals. For example, dialects of English spoken in the
southern United States allow for two modal auxiliaries to occur in the same clause; these occurrences are
often given a cumulative rather than a concord reading.
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It’s widely agreed that in order for a concord reading to be possible, the two modals
must be equivalent. This explains why (50a) allows for a concord reading, but (51) and
(52) do not:
(51) ? You must possibly have read my monograph.
(52) ? You may certainly have read my monograph.
To see why this supports the Certainty Analysis, note that must certainly allows for a
concord reading (Huitink 2012). Here are some naturally occurring examples retrieved
through the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies 2008-):
(53) Something about her told him that she must certainly be noble.
(54) Vanguard keeps costs low, but people must certainly be making financial services
industry salaries.
(55) And the plates on my Subaru station wagon back in New England must certainly
be among the billions contained in private databases.
In each of these examples, it’s natural to give must certainly a concord reading. Those
who reject the Certainty Analysis will thus be forced to reject the well-supported general-
ization that modal concord is only possible when both modals are equivalent.
5.3 An Objection to the Certainty Analysis
Some may object that the Certainty Analysis has trouble explaining the infelicity of epis-
temic contradictions (e.g., (56)) and concessive knowledge attributions (e.g., (57)):
(56) ?? It’s raining but it might not be raining.
(57) ?? I know that it’s raining. But it might not be.40
According to the Certainty Analysis, It might not be raining is true as long as it’s not certain
that it’s raining. Since knowledge does not require certainty, it seems that a speaker could
both know that it’s raining and also know that it’s not certain (for her) that it’s raining.
And so it is unclear why (56) and (57) are infelicitous.
By contrast, the Knowledge Analysis seems well-positioned to explain these data (Stan-
ley 2005). On the Knowledge Analysis, ♦¬p entails that the relevant agents don’t know p.
If we assume the ‘Speaker Inclusion Constraint’, according to which the speaker is always
one of the relevant agents (Egan et al. 2005), concessive knowledge attributions such as
(57) are guaranteed to be inconsistent. And while epistemic contradictions such as (56) are
not predicted to be inconsistent, proponents of the Knowledge Analysis have a plausible
pragmatic explanation of their infelicity. After all, many Knowledge Firsters hold that
assertion is governed by a knowledge norm:
40The label ‘epistemic contradictions’ is due to Yalcin (2007). The label ‘concessive knowledge attributions’
is due to Rysiew (2001).
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Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KA): Assert p only if you know p.41
Combining the Knowledge Analysis with KA predicts that (56) is never assertable.
Knowing the first conjunct (It’s raining) precludes knowing the second (It might not be), so
no one could assert (56) while abiding by KA. On the face of it, this is an elegant result,
since a major argument for KA is that it explains the infelicity of Moorean assertions, e.g.:
(58) ?? It’s raining but I don’t believe/know it’s raining.
So by appealing to KA, proponents of the Knowledge Analysis offer a unified account of
the infelicity of epistemic contradictions and Moorean assertions.
There are two ways that proponents of the Certainty Analysis could respond to this
objection. The first is to replace KA with a certainty norm of assertion. There are a
couple of ways of formulating such a norm, depending on whether one thinks permissible
assertion requires epistemic certainty, psychological certainty, or both. For my purposes, I
will focus on a simple version of a certainty norm, according to which epistemic certainty
is the requisite state:
Certainty Norm of Assertion (CA): Assert p only if p is epistemically certain for you.42,43
Armed with CA, advocates of the Certainty Analysis can explain the infelicity of epis-
temic contradictions on pragmatic grounds. If the first conjunct of (56) is epistemically
certain, then It is not raining is incompatible with what’s epistemically certain. And so the
second conjunct is false, hence not epistemically certain. Thus no one could assert (56)
without violating CA. Moreover, since knowledge is factive, this explanation generalizes
to explain the infelicity of concessive knowledge attributions.
Some may worry that CA is ad hoc. But it can be motivated on independent grounds.
Stanley (2008), following Unger (1975), notes that it sounds odd to say:
(59) ?? It’s raining but it’s not certain that it’s raining.
Given that knowledge doesn’t entail epistemic certainty, KA doesn’t explain the oddity
of (59). CA does; it would be impossible to utter this sentence while obeying CA. Hence
(59) suffers from the same ailment as (56). Assuming that epistemic certainty entails
knowledge, CA also accounts for the original Moorean assertions (e.g., (58)) that motivated
KA.44
41See, in particular, Williamson 1996, 2000. Unger (1975), Slote (1979), DeRose (2002), Sutton (2007), and
Kelp (2018) all endorse versions of KA.
42The idea for such a norm can be traced to Moore (1959), who claims that when I assert p, I imply that p
is certain. However, Moore thought that knowledge entailed certainty. For a defense of CA as an alternative
to KA, see Stanley 2008.
43As Stanley (2008) observes, a norm along these lines seems most plausible if the standards of certainty
are taken to be set by the asserter’s context. On this construal, the norm says that you should only assert p in
a context c if p counts as epistemically certain in c.
44Moorean assertions involving psychological certainty also sound odd, e.g.,
(iv) ?? It’s raining but I’m not certain that it’s raining.
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A further advantage of CA is that it addresses a residual challenge for the idea that
knowledge does not entail certainty. The challenge arises from the fact that it sounds odd
to say things like:
(60) ?? I know it’s raining, but I don’t know for certain that it’s raining.
According to CA, (60) is infelicitous for the exact same reason as (59). No one who is
obeying CA could utter (60) unless both conjuncts were epistemically certain, but—given
the factivity of knowledge—that is impossible.45
Thus a certainty norm of assertion offers one promising way of explaining the recal-
citrant data. An alternative strategy is to modify the Certainty Analysis to predict that
such sentences are semantically defective. For example, we could recast the Certainty
Analysis as a version of update semantics (Veltman 1996). According to update semantics,
the meaning of a sentence is its ability to change an information state (a set of worlds
representing some body of information). An atomic sentence such as It’s raining updates
an information state s by removing any not-raining worlds from s. By contrast, modals are
tests on information states. It might be raining tests to see whether s contains at least one
world where it isn’t raining. If so, s passes the test, and is returned unscathed. If not, s
crashes, returning the absurd information state. Similarly, It must be raining tests whether
s contains only worlds where it’s raining.
Where does certainty come in? We can reframe the Certainty Analysis as an account of
information states. According to this proposal, an information state is simply a set of con-
textually restricted E -alternatives: it’s the set of contextually relevant worlds compatible
with what’s epistemically certain for the relevant folks. This ‘Updated Certainty Analysis’
still accounts for the connection between epistemic modals and certainty that motivated
our original analysis (§5.2). At the same time, it provides a semantic explanation of the
infelicity of (56) and (57). This is because update semantics predicts that epistemic con-
tradictions are semantically defective, in the sense that they are guaranteed to crash any
information state (Veltman 1996; Gillies 2001). Consider (56) (It’s raining and it might not
be). Updating an information state with the first conjunct results in an information state
that contains only worlds where it’s raining. And so this information state is bound to
fail the test imposed by the second conjunct. This explanation generalizes to explain the
To explain this, we can appeal to the normative connection between psychological and epistemic certainty
(§2.1). Suppose the first conjunct of (iv) is epistemically certain. Then the speaker ought to be psychologically
certain that it’s raining. So either the second conjunct is false (and hence not epistemically certain) or the
speaker is being irrational.
45These advantages notwithstanding, some might worry that a certainty norm of assertion is too demand-
ing. Suppose I stand in a strong epistemic relation to p, but my relation does not quite rise to the level of
certainty. If I am asked whether p is true, wouldn’t it be unduly hesitant to refrain from asserting p? (Thanks
to a referee for raising this concern.) While I acknowledge the force of this objection, two points are worth
noting. First, we are not usually restricted to just two options: asserting p or falling silent. Another option
is to use probabilistic language (§4.2.2). For example, we can say Probably p, or even It’s 99% likely that p. In
cases where we clearly fall short the contextual standards for certainty, arguably a hedged assertion along
these lines is the most appropriate response. Second, it is telling that we often opt out of providing an answer
by citing our lack of certainty, e.g., Q: When is the bus coming?, A: I’m not certain/sure. For more on ‘opting out’,
see Dorst (2014).
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infelicity of concessive knowledge attributions: given the factivity of knowledge, (57) will
also crash any information state.
Thus while the infelicity of epistemic contradictions and concessive knowledge attribu-
tions poses a prima facie hurdle for the Certainty Analysis, there are two natural strategies
for explaining the data: one pragmatic, one semantic. Which of these strategies is prefer-
able? On the one hand, we saw that a certainty norm of assertion can be motivated on
independent grounds (specifically, its ability to explain the full range of Moorean asser-
tions). On the other hand, Yalcin (2007) argues that epistemic contradictions are infelici-
tous in embedded contexts, unlike Moorean assertions. According to Yalcin, this creates
trouble for purely pragmatic explanations of the infelicity of epistemic contradictions. This
observation, if correct, speaks in favor of a semantic explanation of the data.
For present purposes, we need not choose between the two strategies. (It may even
turn out that both strategies are required to account for the full range of data.) The
important point is that they offer ample resources for warding off the main objection to
analyzing epistemic modals in terms of certainty.
5.4 Taking stock
Our ordinary uses of epistemic modals suggest that they’re closely tied to certainty. This
motivates a Certainty Analysis, according to which epistemic modals quantify over the
possibilities compatible with what’s epistemically certain.
The Certainty Analysis also fits naturally with the treatment of evidential probability
in §4. Both necessity modals and pos form epistemic certainty ascriptions are logically
stronger than probably claims, which are in turn stronger than might claims:
(61) a. It’s certain the butler did it/The butler must have done it. ⇒
b. It’s likely/probable the butler did it. ⇒
c. The butler might have done it.
On the picture that emerges, epistemic certainty ascriptions, epistemic modals, and
expressions of evidential probability all reside on the same scale. Pos form epistemic
certainty ascriptions and necessity modals target the top of the scale: both are used to
indicate that a proposition is maximally certain (relative to the context). Probability oper-
ators live lower on the scale: they indicate that a proposition has a fairly high degree of
epistemic certainty. Finally, epistemic might inhabits the bottom of scale: it indicates that
a proposition isn’t ruled out by what’s epistemically certain.
6 Wherefore Knowledge?
Recent epistemology has tended to give short shrift to certainty. In this essay, I’ve mounted
a rehabilitation campaign. The notion of certainty is worthy of attention in its own right;
moreover, it can be enlisted into epistemological service. By analyzing evidential prob-
ability and epistemic modals in terms of certainty we can account for a wide range of
data—linguistic and otherwise—that are left unexplained by rival approaches.
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By way of conclusion, I want to address a residual question that may be bothering
some readers. I’ve argued that many of the roles traditionally assigned to knowledge are
better served by certainty. If I’m right about this, then what work is left for knowledge to
do?
This may seem particularly puzzling given the analysis of knowledge and certainty
defended here. On our analysis, knowledge and epistemic certainty have much in com-
mon. Both involve ruling out error possibilities. It’s just that epistemic certainty involves
ruling out a wider range thereof. There is a distinction here, to be sure, but why is this a
distinction worth drawing? What is the point of having both notions?46
In response, we should start by noting that natural language frequently makes similar
distinctions. Consider the distinction between good and excellent. Both terms have similar
meanings. But the latter is stronger than the former. An excellent paper is a good paper,
but a good paper need not be excellent. Moreover, this difference can matter a great deal
(e.g., when it comes to publishing in certain journals).
For an even closer parallel with knowledge and certainty, consider the distinction be-
tween weak necessity modals (should, ought) and strong necessity modals (must, necessarily,
have to). While these two classes of expressions have similar meanings, the latter are logi-
cally stronger than the former, as shown by the contrast in (62):
(62) a. You should give all of your extra income to charity, but you don’t have to.
b. ?? You must give all of your extra income to charity, but you don’t have to.
It is a matter of debate how best to analyze the distinction between weak and strong
necessity modals. However, one natural approach is to analyze both as universal quanti-
fiers over worlds. It’s just that the domain of the former is a proper subset of the domain
of the latter. To illustrate this idea with deontic modals (e.g. (62)), we might hold that
deontic should universally quantifies over all of the very best worlds in some contextually
relevant domain. By contrast, deontic must and have to universally quantify over all of
the acceptable worlds in the contextually relevant domain—that is, all the worlds that are
good enough for the purposes of the context.47 If we accept an analysis in this vein, the
structural relationship between weak and strong necessity modals provides a particularly
close analogue for the relationship between knowledge and certainty.
Thus my analysis of the relation between knowledge and certainty is not without
precedent; we carve out similar distinctions elsewhere in the normative landscape. Still,
the question remains: what is the point of having a notion of knowledge in addition to
certainty?
Faced with this question, one option would be to go pluralist: while many important
epistemological roles are best served by certainty, others are best served by knowledge. For
example, one prima facie attractive hypothesis is that knowledge serves as the normative
standard for belief.48
46Thanks to a referee for raising this question.
47For an analysis along these lines, see von Fintel and Iatridou 2008; Beddor 2017.
48For sympathetic discussion of the idea that knowledge is the norm of belief, see Williamson 2000, forth-
coming; Sutton 2007; Moss 2018.
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This suggestion can be made to fit rather nicely into the theoretical framework devel-
oped here. On our framework, belief is a weaker state than psychological certainty: one
can believe something without being psychologically certain of it. Precisely because be-
lief is weaker than psychological certainty, an epistemic certainty norm of belief is highly
implausible. Suppose you believe the butler did it. But you are not quite certain of it,
and rationally so—your evidence leaves open the possibility, albeit a remote one, that the
gardener was the culprit.
So we need a less demanding epistemic state than certainty to serve as the standard
for belief. Knowledge is a natural candidate. This would offer one way of further devel-
oping the analogy floated in §2: knowledge is to belief as psychological certainty is to epistemic
certainty. On the view that emerges, knowledge imposes the same sort of normative con-
straint on belief that epistemic certainty imposes on psychological certainty.
While this hypothesis is appealing, we should recognize that it faces some important
challenges. In particular, some of the linguistic data indicating that one can permissibly
believe something in the absence of certainty also seem to indicate that one can permissibly
believe something in the absence of knowledge. Consider:
(63) I believe she’s going to accept the job, but I don’t know one way or the other.
While intuitions may differ across speakers, to my ears (63) sounds perfectly coherent.
This creates at least a prima facie challenge for a knowledge norm of belief.49
Those who reject a knowledge norm of belief could go one of two ways. One would be
to stick with the pluralist route and find some other function for knowledge to serve. But
a more radical option is also worth considering. According to the monist route, we should
reject the assumption that knowledge has any interesting work to do. Perhaps once we
look into the matter, we’ll find that certainty is better qualified to fulfill all of the jobs
traditionally associated with knowledge. I will leave it to future research to investigate
which of these routes proves more promising.50,51
49For further linguistic data suggesting that belief is a relatively weak state, see Hawthorne et al. 2016;
Beddor and Goldstein 2018. Another potential challenge for a knowledge norm of belief is more theoretical.
The knowledge norm of belief is sometimes motivated by the idea that the norm of belief parallels the norm
of assertion. Belief, on this view, is a sort of ‘inner assertion,’ and hence should be held to the same normative
standard as ‘outer assertion.’ But if we accept my earlier suggestion that epistemic certainty is the norm
of assertion, then we cannot use this argument to motivate the idea that knowledge is the norm of belief.
(Thanks to a referee for helpful comments here.)
50For further exploration of the applications of certainty in epistemology, see Beddor forthcoming, where I
argue for a certainty norm of practical reasoning.
51A very early version of some of these ideas appeared in chapter three of my dissertation (Beddor 2016).
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